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THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
LSTER B. ORFIEII*
Since 1932, the defense of entrapment has been firmly established
in the federal courts; however, the doctrine itself is replete with
basic confusion. In recent years, this underlying confusion has
prompted the development of disparate rules governing the scope
and application of the defense.
EARLY AMERICAN CASES
THE DOCTRINE of entrapment was a relative late-comer to the
federal courts,' and its incipient growth was surrounded by con-
fusion concerning both the elements necessary to constitute the de-
fense and the theory on which the courts were to set aside a conviction
where acts explicitly proscribed by criminal statutes had undoubtedly
been performed by the defendant. In fact, the early cases do not
even appear to recognize the term "entrapment" as a word of art;2
rather, the concept developed from the relatively obscure bodies of
law designated "decoys" 3 or "inducements." 4
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Author, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES (1966) (two volumes of
projected six-volume treatise), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREs' TO APPEAL (1947),
CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939).
" In a number of early cases the factual situations seemed to present the issue of
entrapment, but since the courts did not appear to recognize the defense, the defendants
failed to raise it. See United States v. Foye, 25 Fed. Cas. 1198 (No. 15157) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1853); United States v. Cottingham, 25 Fed. Cas. 673 (No. 14872) (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1852).
2Exemplary of the absence of a fixed terminology was the allegation of the de-
fendant in Nutter v. United States, 289 Fed. 484 (4th Cir. 1923), that his conviction
should be set aside because he was "tempted or entrapped." See United States v.
Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214, 216 (D. Conn. 1923): "It is true that the accused was en-
trapped by the'action of the government agents, but this does not necessarily indicate
that the government officers lured the defendant, or incited or induced him to do
what he would not have done, in the absence of the actions of the government agents."
SE.g., United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349, 350 (D. Mont. 1913) ("Decoys are per-
missible to entrap criminals, but not to create them').
I Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915). See also Peterson v.
United States, 255 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1919) ("incited ... and lured'); People v. Braisted,
13 Colo. App. 532, 58 Pac. 796 (1899) ("instigated and contrived').
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Perhaps fortuitously, early judicial discussions of the defense were
aided by recognition of an analogy to the common law defense of
'consent." 'Thus, in United States v. Whittier,5 the court relied
upon an English robbery case 6 in which the consent of the victim was
proved and held that a conviction for sending contraceptive inforina-
tion through the mails would be reversed where the defendant had
been induced by the Government to transmit the matter to a non-
existent person.7 However, the concurring opinion in Whittier
refused to adopt the consent analogy and treated the case as one of
first impression. It was felt that "no court should, even to aid in
detecting a supposed offender, lend its countenance to . . . con-
trivances for inducing a person to commit a crime." Thus, although
it was acknowledged that traditional legal principles would not suffice
to dispose of convictions secured through entrapment, no concrete
delineation of the new doctrine was provided. 9
In United States v. Adams,0 another conviction based upon
illegal use of the mails was reversed in an opinion which stressed the
solicitations of the Government official and the apparent reluctance
of the accused to commit the offense on his own." A defense based
528 Fed. Cas. 591 (No. 16688) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).
The Case of Macdaniel, Fost. 121, 168 Eng. Rep. 60 (P.C. 1755).
7 The court reasoned that because the addressee was non-existent, there had been
no "giving of information" within the meaning of the statute, Act of July 12, 1876,
ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (now 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964)). 28 Fed. Cas. at 593.
The concept of consent arose in another context relevant to entrapment. It was
suggested that where the government, through its agents procured a crime, the sanction
of the government vitiated criminal liability on the theory that volenti non fit injuria.
People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 295, 70 N.E. 786, 793 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
8 28 Fed. Cas. at 594. In the same year in which Whittier was decided, two Michi-
gan Supreme Court judges concurring in the reversal of a breaking and entering con-
viction mentioned the "utterly indefensible" conduct of the police in lending aid to
the defendant for purposes of prosecution. Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878)
(concurring opinion).
' Several cases involving entrapment followed Whittier, but none of them excused
the defendant on that ground, although the official conduct involved was denounced in
dictum. United States v. Jones, 80 Fed. 513 (C.C.E.D. 'Va. 1897); United States v.
Grimm, 50 Fed. 528 (E.D. Mo. 1892), aff'd, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); United States v. Rapp,
30 Fed. 818, 822 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1887). However, some judges thought the use of decoy
letters for postal offenses was essential. United States v. Dorsey, 40 Fed. 752, 754 (S.D.
Miss. 1889); United States v. Wight, 38 Fed. 106, 109 (E.D. Mich. 1889); see Goode v.
United States, 159 U.S. 663, 669 (1895).
ao 59 Fed. 674 (D. Ore. 1894).
11In its reasoning, the court emphasized the concurring opinions in Whittier and
People v. Saunders, 38 Mich. 218 (1878). In Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604
(1895), the Court, in the context of another decoy letter case, distinguished Adams as
applying only to a situation where it is "the purpose of the post office inspector to
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upon entrapment was raised in several subsequent state cases, usually
without success, although undue government persuasion does not
appear to have been present in most of them.12  In United States v.
Healy,13 the emerging doctrine of entrapment became at the same
time both clearer and more obscure. The defendant's conviction
for illegally selling liquor to an Indian was reversed when it appeared
that federal agents had disguised an Indian as a non-Indian in order
to elicit the criminal act. Without condoning a person who knew
that he was selling to an Indian,14 the court held that the defendant
was relieved of statutory punishment
by the government's invitation, which is of the nature of fraudu-
lent concealment and deceit, and, if not consent, yet doth work an
estoppel. Though the seller has violated the statute, he was the
passive instrument of the government and his is a blameless wrong
for which he cannot be justly convicted.15
The next major step in the progression came in Woo Wai v.
United States,' where a conviction for criminal conspiracy was
reversed upon a showing that Government agents had induced the
defendant to embark upon a program to import Chinese labor in
induce or solicit the commission of a crime, but [not where the object is] ... to ascer-
tain whether the defendant was engaged in an unlawful business." Id. at 610.
22 E.g., City of Evanston v. Myers, 172 Ill. 266, 50 N.E. 204 (1898) (city furnished
money for liquor purchase); State v. Lucas, 94 Mo. App. 117, 67 S.W. 971 (1902) (dram-
shop law violated). In DeGraff v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 519, 103 Pac. 538 (1909), the
court rejected the defense, and in State v. Smith, 152 N.C. 763, 67-S.E. 922 (1910), the
court refused to impute wrongful conduct to the state.
However, in a series of Colorado cases the courts refused, as contrary to public
morals, to allow municipalities to recover fines from liquor sales offenses where it was
apparent that the sales had been induced primarily for the purpose of obtaining prose-
cutions and increasing revenues. Wilcox v. People, 17 Colo. App. 109, 67 Pac. 343
(1902); People v. Braisted, 13 Colo. App. 532, 58 Pac. 796 (1899); Ford v. City of
Denver, 10 Colo. App. 500, 51 Pac. 1015 (1898). An early Pennsylvania case reversed
a conviction for subornation of perjury where the defendant had attempted to affect
the testimony of a government agent. Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Pa. Dist. 206 (Q.S.
Philadelphia County 1909). "Such a proceeding is not a reality, but merely a tragical
farce, in which the detective, masquerading as a criminal, captivates the unsophisticated
defendant, and then, with mock heroics, denounces him." Id. at 207. See People
v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 70 N.E. 786 (1904), where the majority affirmed a conviction over
an allegation of entrapment on the grounds that the criminal design originated in the
mind of the defendant. One dissenting judge thought that the state "should be
estopped, as is a private individual, who seeks to induce a person by scheme or device
to commit a crime." Id..at 309, 70 N.E. at 799 (dissenting opinion).
"202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913).
Id. at 350. Since the offense in Healy was one of strict liability, no criminal in-
tent was necessary. See Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918).
" 202 Fed. at 850.
1e 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
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violation of the federal laws. There was evidence that the degree
of persuasion was substantial,1 7 that protections from prosecution
were assured, 8 and that the defendant was reluctant to accede to the
pleas. 9  The court found that no conspiracy had been proved but
went on to hold in the alternative that
it is against public policy to sustain a conviction obtained in a
manner which is disclosed by the evidence in this case [and] ... a
sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality
of those who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the
letter of the criminal statutes."
In the years following Woo Wai the number of cases involving
the defense of entrapment increased geometrically, 2' but the contours
of the defense remained vague.22 The first opportunity which the
Supreme Court had after Woo Wai to dispel the confusion arose in
Casey v. United States.23 In that case, however, since the defense had
not been raised at trial, the Court refused to consider it on appeal.2 4
17 Id. at 413-14.
Is Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 415. In Woo Wai, the court made a clear distinction between the failure
to find all the elements of the alleged crime and excusing the defendant where the
government conduct was reprehensible.
Two explanations for the trend culminating in Woo Wai are possible. First, the
absence of some element of the crime, a technical factor present in many of the cases
as an alternative ground for decision, was neither satisfying to the underlying sense
of justice nor always available. Second, it must have become apparent that judicial
dicta condemning improper government practices were having no great impact upon
official conduct. It was perhaps inevitable that, with new liquor and narcotics laws
and the establishment of special agencies to enforce them, a point would be reached
where some particularly odious conduct would lead to a refusal by the courts to con-
vict. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Prov.
ocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091, 1099 & n.22 (1951).
21 See Annot., 18 A.L.R. 146 (1922). The federal cases on entrapment up to 1931
are listed in O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 678 n.1 (7th Cir. 1931).
29 See, e.g., Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925). Courts continued
to differ as to the basis of the defense. Compare United States v. Eman Mfg. Co., 271
Fed. 353 (D. Colo. 1920) and United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918), with
Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924) and United States v. Lynch, 256
Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918). The rule developed that entrapment was a question for thejury, Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921); Peterson v. United States, 255
Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1919), unless insufficient evidence of entrapment was offered, Hall v.
United States, 46 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1931); Vamvas v. United States, 13 F.2d 347 (5th
Cir. 1926). See notes 175-85 infra and accompanying text.
s 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
2, Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented, finding it of no consequence that the defense was
raised for the first time on appeal: "This prosecution should be stopped, not because
some right of Casey's has been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To
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It was not until 1932 in Sorrells v. United States25 that the Supreme
Court finally stepped in to establish the theory on which the defense
was to rest and to indicate in general terms the conditions precedent
to its proper invocation. 6 While Sorrells firmly embedded the
defense in federal criminal law, full formulation of the doctrine is
still not altogether complete.
ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE
By the time that Sorrells was decided, the federal courts had
arrived at a relatively certain definition of entrapment2 7 which was
enunciated in Mr. Justice Roberts' concurring opinion as follows:
Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or
fraud of the officer.28
However, application of this definition with its obscure distinctions
has baffled the courts and has prompted vague instructions to the
jury.29 Minor variations apparently designed to render the test more
concrete have thus been suggested. In much-quoted language,30 Mr.
protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts." Id.
at 425 (dissenting opinion).
2 287 U.S. 485 (1932).
2 6 In Sorrells, the Court unanimously held that entrapment had not been disproved
as a matter of law and that it was error for the trial court not to submit the issue of
entrapment to the jury. The Court was split 5-4, however, on the critical question of
the basis of the defense. See notes 114-18 infra and accompanying text.
37 See Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973, 978 n.1 (4th Cir.) (collecting cases), reld,
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
29 287 U.S. at 454. The Court concluded that entrapment exists when the crim-
inal design has originated in the mind of the government agent and has been planted
in the mind of an innocent person in order that a prosecution may be instituted.
Sorrells v. United States was noted in Note, 13 B.U.L. REv. 293 (1933); Note, 38
Dice. L. R1v. 191 (1933); Note, 1 GEo. WASH. L. Rlv. 371 (1933); Note, 12 ORE. L.
REv. 313 (1933); Note, 1 U. Cm. L. Rv. 115 (1933); Note, 42 YALE L.J. 803 (1933);
46 HARv. L. REv. 848 (1933); 31 MicH. L. REv. 1159 (1933); 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 533
(1933); 11 TEx. L. Rxv. 385 (1933); 39 W. VA. L. Rav. 261 (1933). See generally Mikell,
The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942). See
also United States .v. Head, 353 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Gaines, 353
F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Clarke, 343 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1965).
-"Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 355 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 977
(1966); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933); State v. Groulx, 106
N.H. 44, 203 A.2d 641 (1964).
1O E.g., Lucas v. United States, supra note 29; United States v. Gaines, 353 F.2d 276
(6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Clarke, 343 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v.
Accardi, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958); State v. Thurston,
100 Ariz. 297, 413 P.2d 764 (1966).
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Chief Justice Warren explained that "entrapment occurs only when
the criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative activity' of law
enforcement officials [and that] ... a line must be drawn between
the trap for the unwary innocent and the unwary criminal." ' Quite
expectedly, these further delineations added little to the elusive
doctrine.
More recently, Mr. Justice Harlan commented,
Thus before the issue of entrapment can fairly be said to have
been presented in a criminal prosecution there must have been at
least some showing of the kind of conduct by government agents
which may -well have induced the accused to commit the crime
charged.32
While this formulation, like the one set forth by the Model Penal
Code,33 does suggest the type of proof necessary to establish entrap-
ment, it makes no real advance, in distinguishing impermissible
"inducement" from allowable "opportunity," forbidden "trickery"
from acceptable "strategem," or the "unwary innocent" from the
"unwary criminal." The absence of meaningful distinctions is
further complicated by the fact that two of the necessary elements-
original conception of the plan and actual inducement of the de-
fendant-direct the trier of fact to examine the defendant's state of
mind.
In their efforts to determine the situations to which the doctrine
will apply, the courts have attempted to atomize the defense into its
requisite components and thereby render it somewhat more man-
ageable.34 In the abstract, at least, the defense may be conveniently
dissected into four constituent elements: first, a government officer
or agent must instigate the offense; second, government agents must
perform acts constituting inducement; third, the inducements offered
"Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). (Emphasis in original.)
"Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1963).
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"A. public law enforcement official or a person acting in co-operation with such an
official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in con-
duct constituting such offense by either:
"(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such
conduct is not prohibited; or
"(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready
to commit it."
"See, e.g., State v. Thurston, 100 Ariz. 297, 413 P;2d 764 (1966).
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by the government must cause the defendant's conduct; and finally,
the criminal design must not originate in the mind of the defendant.
Participation of government agent
Because a central policy behind the defense is the protection of
"public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of
justice"383 which may well be threatened if the courts permit "en-
forcement of the law by lawless means," 86 the person who induces
the accused to commit the crime must be a government officer3 7 or an
agent of the government. 88 There may be entiapment in a federal
prosecution even though the act of inducement was performed by a
state officer not acting under the direction of or in collaboration with
any federal officer.3 9 However, there can be no entrapment when
a private person induces the defendant's acts, even where he uses the
most insidious forms of fraud and trickery.40
35 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 569, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
as Ibid.
37 E.g., Lopez v. United States, 273 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1963); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
Is A few early cases suggested that the entrapping agent had to be acting within his
actual authority for the entrapment defense to be available, since deviation from the
government directions was thought not to be the government's responsibility. See
Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 676, 677 (10th Cir. 1940); Kendjerski v. United States,
9 F.2d 909, 910 (6th Cir. 1926).
Other cases, which appear to represent the majority, give the government agent
what amounts to general authority and permit the defendant to raise the defense even
though the government officials did not sanction the particular conduct. E.g., United
States ex rel. Hassel v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927).
One line of distinction has been drawfn by the courts which makes decisive the fact
of the knowledge of the inducing person. Several decisions have held that where a
government agent has procured the commission of an offense by presenting the oppor-
tunity to an unwitting third party, who, in turn and without specific direction by
the government agent, induces participation in the offense by the defendant, the third
party's inducement of the defendant's crime cannot be attributed to the government
but must be treated as the urgings of a private individual. United States v. Comi, 886
F.2d 856, 860 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 992 (1964); United States v. Romano,
278 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1960); Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958).
However, it has been held that where the government officials have entrapped X, X
may become a government agent for the purpose of entrapping his partner Y, and Y.
can raise the defense. United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1957). But see
United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Note, 45 B.U.L. REv. 542,
563-64 (1965).
The types of persons often employed by the government as agents and the methods
by which the gvoernment employs them often serve to enhance the aggravating features
of the government role in the prosecution. See notes 136-48 infra and accompanying
text.
so E.g., Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 1956); Billingsley v.
United States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 656 (1921).0 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
.45
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Government acts constituting inducement
Acts of government agents which will constitute the necessary
"inducement" may assume a variety of guises. Employment of
fraud, trickery, or persuasion is broadly condemned and will support
a finding of inducement.41 In contrast, mere "stealth" and "strate-
gem" designed to provide the defendant an "opportunity" to act
criminally are condoned42 as "necessary weapons in the arsenal of
the police officer." 43  Similarly, mere deception by the government
agent, whereby artifice is used to conceal his official identity, does not
always amount to sufficient inducement.44 Yet, such deception may
suffice45 since "decoys are permissible to entrap criminals but not to
create them." 46 But where the defendant knows that the person with
whom he deals is a government officer, any inference of inducement
may be negated.47
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956); Papadakis v. United
States, 208 F.2d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 1953).
'9See Sherman v. United States, supra note 40, at 373; id. at 384 (concurring opin-
ion); Sorrells v. United States, supra note 40, at 454; United States v. Gaines, 353 F.2d
276, 278 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Gosser, 339 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965).
"2Sherman v. United States, supra note 40; United States v. Gosser, supra note
41; People v. Ramos, 146 Cal. App. 2d 110, 303 P.2d 783 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
"The defense of entrapment is not available to one standing ready to commit an
offense given an opportunity." Bloch v. United States, 226 F.2d 185 (9th Cir.
1955); see Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 883 (1954).
" Sherman v. United States, supra note 40, at 372.
"E.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932); Benson v. California, 336
F.2d 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1964); Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d
749, 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1956); Zucker v. United States, 288 Fed.
12, 16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 756 (1923).
"5 There may be inducement, however, where the actual identity of the agent is a
material fact as to guilt. Thus, where a government agent who was an Indian disguised
his identity to purchase liquor, there vwas inducement. United States v. Healy, 202 F.2d
349 (D. Mont. 1913); cf. Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1940); see also
Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).
"6 United States v. Healy, supra note 45, at 350.
'
T E.g., Reid v. United States, 334 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964); People v. Estrada, 211
Cal. App. 2d 722, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
An obvious and substantial exception to the no-concealment rule, however, is
the application of the defense to bribery. Entrapment may lie where a government
officer demands a bribe, and an otherwise innocent person who fears official retalia-
tion might yield to such a demand. Capuano v. United States, 9 F.2d 41 (1st Cir.
1925); United States v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927). But cf. Scriber v. United
States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).
To be distinguished from these cases are those involving the related defense of
coercion by public officers. See United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1918).
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Understandably, finders of fact, guided only by these oblique
criteria, are cast upon a no-man's land. It may therefore, be instruc-
tive at this point to catalogue certain particular acts which have
been found to constitute inducement. For example, a mere tender
of the purchase price by the government does not establish the in-
ducement necessary to support entrapment in the illegal sale.48
Likewise, providing the defendant with the necessary and requested
means to commit an offense is not in itself an inducement,49 but all
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the procurement of the
crime must be considered.50 Entrapment has been found where the
acts of inducement consisted of pleas to relieve desperate illness,51
offers of large sums of money,5 2 or contrived and persistent coaxing.53
Stated generally, prohibited inducement "includes soliciting, pro-
posing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the commission of the
offense charged."54
Perhaps a more effective approach to inducement is the func-
tional one whereby the sufficiency of the inducement is measured by
its actual impact upon the defendant. Thus, "any effective appeal
to the impulses of compassion, sympathy, pity, friendship, fear, or
hope, other than the ordinary expectation of gain or profit" will be
enough.5 5 Some cases suggest that government conduct which is
48 E.g., Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Bakotich v. United
States, 4 F.2d 386, 387 (9th Cir. 1925). There is merely a permissible trap where the
government offer merely serves to "expose [the defendant] ... to what might be called
the ordinary degree of temptation." Scriber v. United States, supra note 47, at 98.
49 United States V. Roett, 172 F.2d 379 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
50See Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (providing the de-
fendant with six dollars and transportation necessary to purchase narcotics could
constitute inducement).
", E.g., Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933); Driskill v. United States,
24 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1928); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
1" E.g., Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 834 (6th Cir. 1942); United States v.
Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
"8E.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. Gaines, 353
F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1965); Hattem v. United States, 283 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1960); Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). Contra, People v. Hawkins, 210
Cal. App. 2d 669, 27 Cal. Rptr. 1.4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v. Toler, 26 Ill. 2d
100, 185 N.E.2d 874, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 813 (1963).
" United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
"1 United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 163 (D. Neb. 1927). See Note, 33
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1033, 1035 (1958). Contra, People v. Hatch, 49 Ill. App. 2d 177, 199
N.E.2d 81 (1964).
. In keeping with 'the quoted language is Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195,
202 (1st Cir. 1966), in which prompting a local gambler to utilize interstate, com-
munications facilities in order to procure a federal conviction was held to constitute
illegal inducement.
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outrageous will, without more, dictate a finding of entrapment,5 6
but no court has found entrapment on these grounds alone.5 7 How-
ever, under any approach a government agent who merely conducts
himself in a manner typical of victims of crime does not thereby
induce its commission.5
Before the government may legitimately offer an inducement to
a future defendant, the federal courts have required, albeit irregu-
larly, that the government have some knowledge at the time of the
offer that its target might respond to a criminal suggestion. 9 This
requirement provides some safeguard against the possibility that the
government, by capitalizing on anyone's particular weakness, could
make criminals of everyone. However, the application of this
prerequisite has not been uniform. Some courts indicate that gov-
ernmental suspicion of a criminal propensity is a condition precedent
which the government must demonstrate in addition to its showing
of defendant's actual predisposition,6" while others view it as an
5
-Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795 (lst Cir. 1965); Whiting v. United States,
321 F.2d 72, 76 & n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963).
57 The First Circuit in Whiting v. United States, supra note 56, stated that once in-
ducement had been shown, the Government could prove that there was no entrapment
by showing that the inducements were not offensive per se and that the defendant was
not actually corrupted by the solicitations. See note 195 infra.
5, Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862, 870 (D. Md. 1930) (pretended morphine addict);
People v. Johnson, 66 Ill. App. 2d 465, 214 N.E.2d 354 (1966) (robbery target).
6OThe requirement of prior knowledge could well be considered, at least con-
ceptually, as a separate aspect of the defense, designed to check arbitrary police in-
trusion upon citizens. However, the cases are unclear both as to the role which the
requirement assumes in the defense and as to the primary purpose which it serves.
Frequently, the context in which the courts observe that the police had sufficient prior
knowledge makes its difficult to tell whether the requirement is an independent one or
is related to the elements of conception or actual inducement.
While the imposition of any theoretical superstructure upon the cases runs the
risk of finding logic where none exists, a consideration of the possible bases for any
prior-knowledge requirement does point to a- possibly helpful formulation consistent
with the policies which prompted recognition of the defense-discouragement of ob-
jectionable official conduct and protection of its victim. Requiring the government to
have grounds to suspect the target of their prosecution-oriented drama would seem to
produce results compatible with notions of fair" play. Compare Accardi v. United
States, 257 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958). This judgment
is reinforced by reference to the degree of knowledge prerequisite to any valid arrest or
search and seizure. Thus, the failure of the government to show that it had reasonable
grounds to suspect the defendant of a course of criminal conduct, an example of which
they induced, ought to vitiate the criminality of the act so secured.
60 See Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900
(1954); Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948); O'Brien v. United
States, 51 F.2d 674, 680 (7th Cir. 1931); Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86, 89
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 656 (1921): United States v. Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300
(D.D.C. 1964); United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134 (D. Minn. 1926) (semble).
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alternative means by which the government can completely justify
the most obnoxious inducement of a defendant who was not actually
predisposed.," Nor is the extent of prior knowledge which the gov-
ernment must possess firmly established. Although some courts have
discussed the requirement as one of "probable cause" to suspect the
defendant, 62 the general view is that if the government can prove
that it had a reasonable suspicion of the criminal predisposition, its
activities will be justified. 3
A synthesis of the cases, however, suggests a possible test: if the
trap into which the defendant falls is aimed at the community in
general, there is no inducement but only a permissible "opportunity"
afforded to the defendant to commit the prohibited act. On the
other hand, there is inducement where one person or a group of
persons are subjected to the temptation without prior governmental
knowledge amounting to a reasonable suspicion. Moreover, even if
Requiring the government to show not only that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime but also that the government knew he was so inclined before the
inducement was offered would appear to be justified, since government activity in-
discriminately directed against the suspect before such knowledge exists ought to be
discouraged. It has been unsuccessfully urged that the random selection of the
defendant invades constitutionally protected areas. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d
72, 76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963). Nor does the offering of an in-
ducement in the absence of grounds to suspect the target amount to official conduct
which is so offensive per se as to warrant a finding of entrapment as a matter of law.
321 F.2d at 77. In Whiting, the court appears to .have rejected the prior knowledge
requirement altogether. See Sorrells v. United States, 57 F.2d 973, 975 (4th Cir.), rev'd,
287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6",[I]f the government agents suspected appellant of unlawfully dealing in nar-
cotics, they were authorized to take steps to purchase a quantity from him, and,
although the device employed was exceedingly indecent and beneath the dignity of the
United States, the transaction would be sufficient to support the conviction." Wall v.
United States, 65 F.2d 993, 994 (5th Cir. 1933). Implicit in such a rule is the view that
the prior-knowledge requirement is a license, armed with which the government
officers may do whatever they please. See Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 946 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 833 (6th
Cir. 1942); C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1926);
United States v. Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 269 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.
1959); Sherman v. United States, 36 A.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1944) (dis-
senting opinion); Note, 28 CoLu . L. R v. 1067, 1070 (1928).
-Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963);
Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961).
63 E.g., Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619, 620 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
948 (1958) ("probable cause is not required'); Lunsford v. United States, 200 F.2d 237,
239 (1oth Cir. 1952) ("reasonable grounds to believe" prior unlawful conduct);
Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950)
(same); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 833 (6th Cir. 1942) ("reasonable sus-
picion'); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993, 994 (5th Cir. 1933) ("suspected"); O'Brien
v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931) ("strong suspicion'); United States v.
Owens, 228 F. Supp. 300, 303-04 (D.D.C. 1964) ("good faith and ... honest belief").
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the bait tempts the entire community, some cases suggest that there
may be entrapment where the trap is grossly objectionable per se.04
Under such circumstances, the "unwary innocent" as well as the "un-
wary criminal" may be its catch.
Causation of defendant's acts by inducement
After acts amounting to inducement have been shown to have
been performed by government agents, entrapment requires the fur-
ther showing that but for the inducement, the defendant would not
have perpetrated the forbidden acts 5 In the absence of proof that
the crime was causally related to the inducement, the defendant is in
no position to claim that the undesirable government action un-
fairly affected him.""
Evidence that the defendant was actually induced by the govern-
ment agents is similar in kind to the proof necessary to show that
the origin of the criminal plan lay in the government. In both cases,
the concern is with the defendant's "predisposition." That the de-
fendant was actually induced may be unlikely where he displayed a
readiness to commit the act; and conversely, a reluctance to succumb
to the government temptations may evidence an overwhelming of
the will, and thus, actual inducement.67 Similarly, the predisposition
to commit the act as demonstrated by a past pattern of criminal
conduct or prior convictions is relevant, and despite the fact that
access to this information is likely to be misused by the jury, it is
admissible. 6 The kind of proof which evidences predisposition was
set out by Judge Learned Hand to include a showing that the de-
fendant (1) was already engaged in "an existing course of criminal
conduct," (2) had "already formed a design to commit the crime
or similar crimes," or (3) was willing to commit the crime "as evi-
denced by ready complaisance."6 9
6 See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
05 E.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932); United States
v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965). cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); Accardi v.
United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958); State v. Avery,
152 Conn. 582, 211 A.2d 165 (1965).
e6The requirement of causation demonstrates that the policy of the defense
is not solely to check the police. ,Compare Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 75 &
.n.6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963): "So far as the individual defendant is
concerned the defense has no logical core." 321 F.2d at 75.
6T See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1956).
68 See notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text.
69 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d 'Cir. 1933) (Hand, L., J.). Several
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Origin of the criminal design
Another prerequisite to a showing of entrapment is proof that
the criminal plan first originated in the mind of government agents
and not in the mind of the defendant. 70 It is said that the scheme
must be the product of the "creative activity" of the government,71
for the. object of the defense is to prevent "manufacturing of crime"
for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions.72 Prior to some
objective act, however, initiation of the criminal design may be
difficult to establish, since overt manifestations of the defendant's
state of mind are often lacking. An analysis of the cases suggests
that certain types of proof constitute relevant indicia of the de-
fendant's mental state. Thus, if the defendant initiates the sug-
gestion of the crime to a disguised government agent 3 or reacts
quickly and without hesitation to a government suggestion,74 the
trier of fact may infer the requisite state of mind.75 Similarly, proof
cases have purported to follow these guidelines. E.g., United States v. Jones, 302 F.2d
46 (7th Cir. 1962); Jasso v. United States, 290 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 858 (1961); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
70 E.g., Sherman v. United States, 856 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 451 (1932); United States v. Gosser, 339 F.2d 103, 109 (6th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 882 U.S. 819 (1965); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958); United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 761 (1944); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 834 (6th Cir. 1942).
A finding that the design was not conceived by the defendant is essential to the
defense, since, absent such a finding, there can be no entrapment regardless of the
governmental inducement. United States v. Saucedo, 346 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1965);
Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951); United States v. Smith, 43 F.2d
173 (SD. Tex. 1930); People v. Estrada, 211 Cal. App. 2d 722, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). But see Waker v. United States, 344 F.2d 795 (Ist Cir. 1965).
If the defendant originates the scheme but then abandons it, and the government
subsequently induces the conduct, there will be entrapment. United States v. Kloster-
man, 248 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1918). See Marbs v. United States, 250 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1957).
71 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
72 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963).
7' Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386
(1958); United States v. Saucedo, 346 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1965); Reid v. United States,
334 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964).
7' E.g., Maestas v. United States, 841 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1965); Whiting v. United
States, 321 F.2d 72, 77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); Brainin v. United
States, 314 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1963); Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir.
1958).75 Locating the origin of the criminal design is one of the more difficult factual
problems connected with the defense. The defendant, of course, is free to show that
he reluctantly agreed to carry out a plan proposed by the police and a product of their
creative activity. See United States v. Cooper, 321 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1963); United
States v. Accardi, 257 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958); City of 'Seattle
v. Evans, 409 P.2d 656 (Wash. 1966). Thus, accosting a partially intoxicated citi-
zen to induce him to obtain liquor can be entrapment. United States v. Echols, 253
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that the defendant has in the past engaged in a pattern of criminal
conduct might support a finding by the trier of fact that he originated
the scheme.76
The requirement that the government must initiate the criminal
design has not been adopted without criticism. According to the
concurring opinions in both Sorrells and Sherman, the prior record
or predisposition of the defendant has no place in the doctrine, 7"
since the sole purpose, they contend, is to restrain the government
from "enforcement of the law by lawless means.178  However, be-
cause an equally important function of the defense is to exonerate
the wronged defendant, this criticism has not prevailed."'
Entrapment as to particular offenses
Entrapment has been successfully asserted as a defense to prosecu-
tions for a variety of crimes. No federal court has yet held that
there is a crime for which the defense is ihapplicable8 0  Although
the defense is probably employed most frequently in narcotics prose-
cutions,81 entrapment has been raised in prosecutions for military
Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918). A plan whereby federal officers convinced a young man to
bring liquor into the United 'States was found to be of Government origin. United
States v. Certain Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 Fed. 824 (D.N.H. 1923), 10
VA. L. REv. 316 (1924). Similarly, repeated police requests for narcotics over a long
period of time may indicate government conception. Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 373 (1958). But see People v. Toler, 26 111. 2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1963). A
survey of factual situations in which the conception was attributed either to the de-
fendant or to the government does little more than indicate the difficulty of discerning
mental state from objective facts. Quite appropriately, this issue usually goes to the
jury. See Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 652-54 (Ist ir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
829 (1963); Hattem v. United States, 283 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 812 (1961).
76 E.g., Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1952).
77 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-84 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932). While the test of original conception is probably too vague
and indefinite, it continues to be employed. E.g., Washington v. United States, 275
F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960); Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948 (1959); Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950);
Weathers v. United States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1942).
7' Sherman v. United States, supra note 77, at 380 (concurring opinion).
79 See note 114 infra and accompanying text. But see Hansford v. United States, 303
F.2d 219, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
80 For a listing of crimes, in the trials for which entrapment has been used as a
defense, see Annot., 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 478 (1930); Annot., 18
A.L.R. 146 (1922).
8, See Annot., 33 A.LR.2d 883 (1954); Note, 38 Nom DA M LAw. 741 (1963).
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security violations,8 2 counterfeiting,8 3 perjury,8 4 income tax offenses, 8
gambling and conducting lotteries,86 smuggling, 7 liquor law viola-
tions,88 dealing in gold coins, 89 mail statute violations, 90 war restric-
tions violations,9' and sexual offenses. 92 As this list indicates, official
activity which resembles entrapment usually occurs in the detection
of continuing criminal conduct. Nevertheless, it is significant that
apart from liquor and narcotics violations, attempts to raise the
defense have been singularly unsuccessful. 93
Whether there may be. certain crimes which are so heinous or
detrimental to the public safety that the defense of entrapment will
be unavailable to their perpetrators is an open question94 and, possi-
bly, a moot one. It is doubtful that government agents would so
thoroughly abuse official discretion by victimizing an innocent citizen
merely to procure a prosecution.
T.Eo=tnCAL BASIS
The defense of entrapment in the federal courts exists without
any judicially articulated basis in the Constitution. With the ex-
ception of one unreasoned case in which the court declared that
82 Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943).
88 United States v. Head, 353 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Sferas, 210
F.2d 69, 71 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
8, United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 913 (1954).
8" Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d 386, 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 951
(1953).
8" Cook v. United States, 193 F.2d 373 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
87 Murray v. United States, 250 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
932 (1958).
11 Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
11 Farber v. United States, 114 F.2d 5, 10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 706
(1940).
"0 Weathers v. United States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1942).
01 Shaw v. United States, 151 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir. 1945).
02 Both the kinship and the distinction between the consent defense and the entrap-
ment defense can be seen most readily in cases involving sexual offenses. Thus, where
the charge is homosexual assault, the accused may prevail not because of entrapment,
although the court may use the word, but because the consent of the government
agent vitiated an element of the offense. E.g., Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d
578 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McDermett v. United States, 98 A.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1953). However, where the offense is procuring, pandering, or prostitution it
would appear that entrapment may be an appropriate defense insofar as the bellhop,
night clerk, or woman, not predisposed, succumbs to the inducement of the agent.
E.g., People v. West, 139 Cal. App. 2d 923, 293 P.2d 166 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Cooper v.
State, 162 Tex. Crim. 624, 288 S.W.2d 762 (1956). See Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1194 (1957).
As to abortion, see Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1156 (1957).
0" In every case cited in notes 83-88, 90-92, the conviction was affirmed.
01 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). See also MODEL PENAL CODE
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ignoring a defendant's allegation of entrapment would be a violation
of due process,9 5 the courts have balked at elevating the defense to
constitutional dimensions." The Supreme Court, in recognizing the
doctrine, has relied upon a unique application of statutory construc-
tion" which, however, is not without due process overtones.98  A host
of commentators 9 have suggested a variety of constitutional guaran-
§ 2.13 (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (3), comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
" Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1957). While the court indi-
cated that a conviction based upon acts which also support a finding of entrapment
might violate due process, it relied in part upon the possibility that defendant might
have been denied his constitutional right to counsel. The case was remanded to the
district court where the claim of entrapment was found without merit. The second
conviction was affirmed, Banks v. United States, 258 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958), and the claims that there were constitutional bases
for the defense were rejected.
90 Two unreasoned cases have directly held that freedom from entrapment is not
guaranteed by the Constitution. United States v. Bailey, 331 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1964);
Stanley v. United States, 239 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1956). Nor does the giving of in-
sufficient instructions which vitiate the defense invade the difendant's constitutional
rights. Simmons y. United States, 302 F.2d 71, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1962).
Soliciting the commission of crime does not invade the constitutional rights of the
victim. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884
(1963); see United States v. Locklear, 237 F. Supp. 895, 898-99 (N.D. Cal. 1965). How-
ever, one court has indicated that "police methods designed to tempt innocent persons
into crime are as objectionable as the coerced confession and the unlawful search."
Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958).
See United States ex rel. Toler v. Pate, 332 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
858 (1964); Note, 74 YAI. L.J. 942, 949 n.31 (1965). But see United States ex rel. Hall
v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 891 (1954).
In Raley v. Ohio, 360-U.S. 423, 438 (1959), 5 N.Y.L.F. 439, and Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965), The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 103, 152, 40
TULANE L. REv. 185, the Court spoke of "entrapment" by states as a violation of due
process, but in both cases it seems clear that, even though Sorrells was cited, the Court
did not mean entrapment as a word of art.
It has been argued that, while the courts do not employ constitutional bases in
theory, they do so in fact. See Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 447, 449 (1959).
97 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. U.S. 435, 448-50 (1932). "Congress could
not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons
into violations." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
"8 Exemplary of the language of Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), is the
following: "If the requirements of the highest public policy in the maintenance of the
integrity of administration would preclude enforcement of the statute in such circum-
stances as are present here, the same considerations justify the conclusion that the case
lies outside the purview of the Act and that its general words should not be con-
strued to demand a proceeding at once inconsistent with that policy and abhorrent to
the sense of justice." Id. at 448-49. "To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or
glaringly unjust results, foreign to the legislative purpose, is ...a traditional and
appropriate function of the courts." Id. at 450.
"See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 96, at 449; Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of
Encouragement, 49 VA. L. Rav. 871, 883-84 (1963); Comment, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821; Note,
74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). But see Note, 45 B.U.L. Rav. 542, 549-55 (1965).
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tees on which to bottom the defense, including due process, 00 illegal
search and seizure,10 ' and coerced confessions.1 0 2  It is also possible
200 The Supreme Court has indicated that, before criminal liability can be estab-
lished, due process requires that the defendant perform some act. Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 870 US. 660 (1962). It has been rather tenuously argued that unlimited power
to solicit illegal acts in net effect eliminates the requirement of an act since the police
have it in their power to turn almost anyone into a criminal by choosing a means to
exploit his particular weakness. See Note, 74 YALE LJ. 942, 947 (1965). Similarly, the
Court has held that the requirement of mens tea may be abolished consistently with
due process only in certain limited situations. E.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). It has been unconvincingly
suggested that there is no significant difference between abolishing mens tea as a
necessary element to crime and implanting, through entrapment, the required mental
state. See Note, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821, 826.
There is a distinct similarity between the terms used to describe the evils of en-
trapment and those used to designate governmental conduct constituting a violation of
due process. E.g., Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) ("unconscion-
able'); Rochin v. California, 842 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) ("conduct that shocks the con-
science'); see Cowen, supra note 96, at 449.
Regardless of whether all entrapments are per se violations of due process, one
may reasonably assume that facts comprising a particular entrapment might involve
conduct of the police so outrageous as to violate due process. Compare United States
ex tel. Toler v. Pate, 32 F.2d 425, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1964) (concurring opinion): "To
me, however, it seemed dear that the circumstances of an entrapment case such as
shown by this record are so offensive to the conscience of our society that it must be
embraced within the fluid .concept of the due process requirement." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) But see United States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 905 (1965); Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76-77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
875 U.S. 884 (1963).
101 The Supreme Court in Sherman recognized that when an otherwise innocent
person is induced to commit a crime "stealth and strategy become as objectionable
police methods as the coerced confession and unlawful search." 356 U.S. at 372. It
has been argued than an officer, acting only on suspicion, who induces a person to
commit an offense is improperly "searching" for a crime. Similarly, the values of pri-
vacy, dignity, and personal integrity which underlie the fourth amendment might limit
the government's right to search for offenses. See Note, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). See
also Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. Rav. 871,
883 (1963); Note, 1964 U. ILL L.F. 821, 823. But see Note, 45 B.U.L. Rav. 542, 552
(1965).
A search is permitted only where incident to a lawful arrest or where there is prob-
able cause that an offense has been committed and that the person searched has com-
mitted the offense, and even then, only under certain circumstances. Brinegar v. United
States, 38 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Steele v. United
States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In the case
of entrapment, however, the government commences its efforts against the defendant
before the act for which he is to be prosecuted even occurs. Moreover, to justify
entrapment, the government need not show that it had probable cause that the target
of its efforts committed a crime, but merely that it had reasonable grounds to suspect
a course of criminal behavior in the past. See notes 59-63 supa and accompanying
text.
It has been suggested that additional safeguards be provided for the prospective
victim of entrapment such as requiring that the government procure a "warrant" from
a magistrate upon a showing of the grounds for suspicion or probable cause. Don-
nelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60
YALE L.J. 1091, 1114 n.65 (1951). If such a procedure were adopted, it might serve
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that the victim of an entrapment could convincingly assert that the
government action has deprived him of equal protection of the
laws. 03 At present, however, these assertions have been consistently
rejected by the courts, which have found the confines of the existing
defense sufficiently broad to accomplish the desired results. 10 4
only to underscore the dubious foundation for the government activity, since it would
graphically illustrate in many cases the weakness of the government's evidence and
the baselessness of its suspicion.
While it might be urged that the different consequences resulting from a finding
of entrapment on the one hand and an illegal search on the other-namely, excusing
the offense as opposed to excluding evidence-justify the different standards applied
to the-government's prior knowledge, this position would appear to put the cart before
the horse.
102 It has been argued that there is some analogy between entrapment and coerced
confessions. See Note, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 821, 824; Note, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 949-52 (1965).
"The basic objectives of solicitation and interrogation are functionally equivalent,"
namely, to induce the defendant to supply evidence of his guilt. Id. at 950. "The only
meaningful difference is that in the case of solicitation police disguise their identity and
elicit non-verbal conduct which the defendant does not realize will be used against
him." Ibid. If overbearing a person's will to force him to make an inculpatory statement
or tempt him to do so is forbidden, then overbearing a person's will to get him to com-
mit an offense or tempting him to do so might also be forbidden.
The distinctions between coerced confessions and entrapment, however, far exceed
the similarities. The essential difference between words and conduct is significant for
purposes of the confession rule. 3 WzMOR, EVMIENCE § 821, at 238-39 (3d ed. 1940).
But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In addition, the nature of the
inducement involved in the usual entrapment cases differs in many respects from the
coercion incident to an illegal confession. Accordingly, the degree of coercion suffi-
cient to invalidate a confession is very slight, Ziang Sun Wan v. United States, 266 U.S.
1. 14 (1924), whereas the inducement necessary to establish entrapment must be "un-
toward or unusual." Leon v. United States, 290 Fed. 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 263
U.S. 710 (1929); see United States v. Whiting, 321 F.2d 72, 76-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 884 (1963).
20S Because in the case of an entrapment police activity directed at the victim be-
gins prior to the commission of the act for which he is to be prosecuted, it is clear that
the government has selected the defendant upon some quantum of knowledge. While
the knowledge required has variously been referred to as "probable cause" or "reason-
able suspicion," see notes 59-63 supra, the question for purposes of the guarantees of
the equal protection clause is whether the basis for the government action is "reason-
able" or, on the other hand, "arbitrary." If the selection of the victim were made
arbitrarily, it would seem that full equal protection of the laws had, been denied.
See Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 400 (1964); Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Comment,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1120-22 (1961).
20, The defense of entrapment in the federal courts, existing as it does by reason of
a rule of statutory construction, may, for that very reason, contain certain constitutional
overtones. In construing a statute as not encompassing acts committed as a result of en-
trapment as the Court did in Sorrells and Sherman, it is arguable that the Court was
employing an established rule of statutory construction; namely, statutes are to be con-
strued so as to avoid running afoul of constitutional safeguards. E.g., Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). Thus, it is possible that constitutional guarantees chart
the permissible limits, albeit amorphous, of government conduct amounting to entrap.
ment.
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In addition to the fact that there has been no accepted constitu-
tional basis for entrapment, there has been little agreement among
renowned jurists as to the theory which underpins the defense.105
Earlier cases relied upon analogies to consent or estoppel, 1°0 but the
reasoned opinions seemed to sense the flaws in these principles.10 7
The doctrinal kinship to the defense of coercion has also been sug-
gested,108 but that theory is, at best, only relevant, and then only
remotely, in those occasional cases where the inducement amounts
in fact to a threat. 10  It was recognized at an early date that the
soundest approach to the distillation of a theory lay in treating the
defense as sui generis and independent of traditional criminal
theory."10 Thus, the courts announced that "public policy" required
the reversal of convictions procured by entrapment.'" Behind ex-
pressed avowals that allowing entrapped convictions to stand
would displace public confidence in the law" 2 lay two related inter-
105 Four Justices of the Supreme Court characterized the existing entrapment doc-
trine as being "without the formulated basis in reason that it is the first duty of the
courts to construct." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (concurring
opinion). See Rotenberg, supra note 99, at 903 (indicating the need for continuing
research).
108 Consent: United States v. Whittier, 28 Fed. Cas. 591 (No. 16688) (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1878). See also Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956); note 93 supra.
Estoppel: O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931), 45 HARv. L. REV.
381. Estoppel has been used in a generic sense to denote the underlying policies of
entrapment. Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924).
107 Both the majority and the minority opinions in the leading case recognized the
inadequacy of the doctrine. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448-50 (1932); id.
at 455 (concurring opinion). The use of a word like "estoppel," which possesses a
technical meaning, can only lead to confusion. See Sherman v. United States, 36 A.2d
556, 563 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1944) (dissenting opinion).
108 See United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (element of threat seem-
ingly important). Coercion and entrapment are undoubtedly related in that both
concern behavior of third persons inducing the defendant to commit proscribed acts,
but entrapment is distinguishable in that the inducement is an offer of benefit, rather
than a threat to a vital personal interest. The analogy might be useful, however, as a
basis for limiting the application of entrapment to certain offenses. See notes 80, 94
supra and accompahying text.
209 United States v. Lynch, supra note 108.
210 Sorrells v. United States, 287 US. 435, 446 (1932); id. at 454-55 (concurring
opinion).1 11 Although the cases often spoke of public policy, there was little effort to articu-
late the particular policy offended. Id. at 454 (concurring opinion); see Butts v. United
States, 273 Fed. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412, 415 (9th
Cir. 1915).
2a- Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring): "Public
confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately
depends the rule of law, is at stake." See Sorrells v. United States, supra note 110, at
446. -
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ests: fairness to the victim of the entrapment and discouragement of
official abuses.118
Even after the rationale of the defense became clear, the authority
by which the courts could* ignore violations of the criminal statutes
remained to be settled. The majority of the Court in Sorrells erected
a rule of statutory construction, holding that Congress could not have
intended to subject the victim of an entrapment to criminal sanc-
tions.114 While Sherman v. United States 15 made it clear that the
technique adopted in Sorrells represents the laiv, the device adopted
there has not been unanimously received. The concurring Justices
in Sorrells, through Mr. Justice Roberts, refused to adopt the obvious
fiction of statutory construction and rested their conclusion instead
upon an assertion that the courts have inherent power to refuse to
become instruments of injustice." 6 Recognition of entrapment be-
came an exercise of self-protection. The minority views in Sorrells
and Sherman have been well received by the commentators' 7 and
apparently have mustered'some support in the courts of appeals." 8
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE DEFENSE
In prosecutions where the defense of entrapment is raised, the
introduction of evidence on the relevant issues has created a body
of evidence law which differs from the normal rules. The issues
213 It has been said that law enforcement officers ought to prevent crime, not create
it. E.g., O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931); United States v.
Echols, 253 Fed. 862, 863 (S.D. Tex. 1918). The government ought not be allowed to
procure an offense for the purposes of prosecuting the perpetrator. E.g., Sagansky
v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 202 (Ist Cir. 1966); United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429, 430
(N.D. Ga. 1925). Other courts look to the defendant's plight and revolt against the
unfairness perpetrated upon him. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir.
1956). But see Whiting v. United States, 821 F.2d 72, 75 & n.6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
875 U.S. 884 (1963).
"1287 U.S. at 446-49. For an earlier case adopting the same technique, see O'Brien
v. State, 6 Tex. Crim. 665 (1879).
-" 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
116 287 U.S. at 454-55 (concurring opinion).
"' See Cowen, supra note 96, at 449; Donnelly, supra note 102, at 1112; Williams,
The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FoRD-
uAm L. REv. 399, 417 (1959); 46 HARV. L. Rav. 848, 849 (1933); Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1033, 1039 (1958); Note, 26 TENN. L. REv. 554, 558 (1959). But see Mikell, The
Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 260 (1942);
Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333 (1960).
I's See United States v. Morrison. 348 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1965); Whiting v.
United States, 321 F.2d 72, 75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963); Williamson
v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 172
& n.5 (5th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958).
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which have prompted these aberrations are the defendant's "pre-
disposition" and the role which the government entrapper plays in
procuring the proscribed act.
Proof of predisposition
Because the defense of entrapment rests upon a finding that the
government agents masterminded and elicited the forbidden acts,
the predisposition of the defendant to commit the acts in the absence
of government activity becomes relevant.1 9 The broad concept of
predisposition is most clearly seen as an intermediate fact from which
inferences can be drawn as to the conceptually distinct ultimate facts
of prior governmental knowledge, 2 0 origin of the conception,' 2 ' and
causal consequences of the inducement.1 22 Evidence relevant on the
issue of predisposition may include both direct and hearsay evidence
of the defendant's prior criminal convictions, prior criminal activity
for which he was not convicted, and general character. 23 It is not
119 E.g., Matysek v. United States, 321 F.2d 246. 248 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 917 (1964); Trent v. United States, 284 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 889 (1961); Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 883 (1958); Bloch v. United States, 226 F.2d 185, 188 (9th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 948 (1956).120 See, e.g., Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 75 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 884 (1963).
121 See, e.g., United States v. Head, 353 F.2d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 1965); Trent v.
United States, 284 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1961).
122 Recognition, or even acceptance, of the fact that "predisposition" is an inter-
mediate rather than an ultimate fact has not been accomplished. However, this con-
ceptually important distinction is implicit in the cases. Evidence of predisposition will
support an inference, either permissible or conclusive, that government conduct amount-
ing to inducement did not cause the criminal act or that the defendant actually con-
ceived the crime. Such evidence, if known in advance by the government, may also
be the basis for a finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that the defendant
was engaged in criminal activity.
In most cases, proof of predisposition will conclusively establish that the induce-
ments did not cause the criminal activity. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d
127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1963). But see United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d Cir.
1957).122 E.g., Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948). See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959): "Under the existing law, which
puts the entrapment issue to the jury, the defense can be raised only at a great price to
the defendant. If entrapment is the inducing of an 'innocent' person to a criminal
act, the character of the accused becomes a matter for judicial attention. Is the
defendant a strayed lamb or an ensnared wolf? With character in issue, it becomes
proper to inquire into prior convictions, and the general reputation of the accused.
Even a later offense may be taken into account in estimating disposition to commit an
earlier one. Because the defense may be established under a general plea of not guilty,
proof of a prior conviction is proper on the part of the government when it is clear
that the defense of entrapment will be invoked. Thus many defendants will find
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essential that the government introduce such evidence to demonstrate
predisposition,1 24 since the fact can also be proved by more'direct
proof.125 However, a mere showing that the defendant had previously
engaged in illegal conduct does not preclude the defense.1 26
Of course, it is necessary that the defense of entrapment be raised
before the otherwise inadmissible predisposition evidence may be
introduced. 27 Thus, if the defendant does not rely on entrapment1 28
or takes the defense out of the case,129 the damaging evidence must be
excluded. Where the government introduces the evidence before
the defendant raises the issue, any error thereby made will be cured
if the defendant, at a later time, raises the issue.180
Courts are generally receptive to predisposition evidence of past
that they are deprived of the general rule prohibiting reference to evidence of other
crimes."
124E.g., Young v. United States, 286 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 970 (1961); Lathem v. United States, 259 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958); United States
v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 386 (1957). In Young, the
Ninth Circuit noted that requiring the government to show prior convictions would
"in effect give the [defendant] ... 'one free shot' before he could be convicted." 286
F.2d at 15.
121 Predisposition may be established by proof that the defendant reacted quickly
and without hesitation to the government suggestion. See Lathem v. United States,
supra note 124. The methods of proving predisposition vary with the crime. Com-
pare United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1957) (bribery convic-
tion): "It is our view that in a crime of this nature, occurring as it does usually only
once and not in a series, is not like the sale of narcotics or of contraband liquor, so
it is virtually impossible to show a course of conduct [sic]."
228 "A criminal record is relevant in regard to a predisposition or propensity, but
does not preclude the defense of entrapment." Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d
219, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909, 912 (5th
Cir. 1959) (by implication). In Jasso v. United States, 290 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 858 (1961), the court approved an instruction to the jury which re-
quired the defendant to be free of past guilt in order to raise the defense. However,
the court 'did indicate in dictum that defendant could still raise the defense if he
showed that he had abandoned the path of criminality before the government induce-
ment. 290 F.2d at 674.
2 In United States v. Costner, 359 F.2d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1966), one of the de-
fendants did not raise the defense of entrapment, and the court held that it was
reversible error for the judge to have admitted otherwise inadmissible predisposition
evidence. See Jasso v. United States, supra note 126 (objections to hearsay evidence of
predisposition waived when defendant pleads entrapment).
125 Neill v. United States, 225 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1955).
" In Nutter v. United States, 289 Fed. 484 (4th Cir. 1923), the defendant claimed
entrapment, but also denied commission of the offense. The court held that the
denial precluded the defense of entrapment and reversed the lower court conviction
because predisposition character evidence was erroneously admitted where entrapment
was not properly in issue.
110 United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1957), revd on other grounds,
356 U.S. 369 (1958); Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948); see
Reece v. United States, 131 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1942). *
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convictions despite the fact that they are dissimilar to the instant
crime'31 or quite removed in time. 3 2  Realizing that the jury might
well misuse such information, some precautions have been inter-
jected. One court has excluded uncorroborated evidence of prior
offenses by applying a calculus of relevancy, finding the value of the
evidence outweighed by the danger of prejudice. 33 However, the
usual method by which courts control the dangers connected with
predisposition evidence is to give cautionary instructions which di-
rect the jury to consider it only on the issue of predisposition and
not to prove the mens rea or the commission of the act.' 34
Entrappers and informers
The presence as a witness of the government's agent who had
solicited the defendant's conduct is often necessary to corroborate or
refute the defendant's account of the alleged entrapping acts. The
government may be reluctant to call the agent, who all too frequently
is an unsavory character whose value derives from his ability to work
his way into the confidence of those engaged in criminal activity.
At best such a person makes a poor witness and usually underscores
the objectionable nature of the government machinations. 135
While it has been held that the failure by the government to call
the entrapper is not reversible error,13  the prevailing rule seems
to be that, since he is usually the only other person who can shed
light on the issue, the government must either produce the agent or
181 Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795, 797-98 (9th Cir. 1952), 31 Cmr.-KEr L.
Rav. 246 (1953). But see note 133 infra and accompanying text.
1-2 Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900
(1954); Carlton v. United States, supra note 131, at 799-800. But see Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958) (remote character evidence insufficient in itself to prove
predisposition).
288This enlightened position is taken in Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219
(D.C. Cir. 1962), where highly inflammatory but minimally relevant evidence was
excluded. See United States v. Costner, 359 F.2d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1966).
184 See Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960). See also
Sauvain v. United States, 31 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1929).
s18 See generally Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
188 Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1960): "The government
is not required to call all witnesses who are competent to testify .... The principle
applies even to a special agent or informer who participated in the transaction." See
also Trent v. United States, 284 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1960).
In O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931), although the Government's
failure to call the informer-entrapper was not error, the court" noted that "the evi-
dence has been examined [on appeal] with that fact as background." Id. at 676.
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show cause why it could not.13 7 It would logically follow that if the
government informs the defendant that it will not produce the agent,
the defendant must object to preserve the error.18  To assure the
presence of the agent whose testimony may be crucial to a defendant
who is not likely to be believed, the court may call the agent sua
sponte139 and at least should grant a continuance to allow the de-
fendant to call him.140
A practice which the federal courts have eschewed has been the
employment of-entrapping agents on a contingent fee basis. Under
such an arrangement of bounties , courts fear that the likelihood of
snaring an innocent is unhealthily enhanced. 41 In Williamson v.
United States 42 the court revolted at the contingent fee system and
held that, absent government proof of some "justification," use of
this method would, in itself, render the government conduct so
objectionable as to constitute entrapment.143 Subsequent cases, how-
ever, have found sufficient justification where the government had
prior knowledge of defendant's unlawful conduct 44 or where the
137 United States v. Clarke, 220 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1963): "We think com-
mon fairness made it the Government's duty to produce [the agent] . . . at the
trial, or, failing that, to show that reasonable efforts to produce him were fruitless." In
Clarke, as in most similar cases, the agent was deemed to be a key witness. Cf. United
States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86 (ED. Tenn. 1963) (contingent fee informer). See
also United States v. Jones, 360 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1966) (government must provide
defendant with agent's name, information of his whereabouts, and must extend "reason-
able cooperation'); Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1965)
(government must make "reasonable efforts" to produce the agent); Orfield, Privileges
in Federal Criminal Evidence, 40 U. DET. L.J. 403, 421 (1963); 64 COLUM. L. REv. 359
(1964). See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 65 n.15 (1957). Production of
the entrapping agent may be necessary to sustain the government's burden of proof.
See Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1959).
However, where the allegation of entrapment is patently frivolous, the government
may not have to produce the agent. See United States v. Julia, 348 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.
1965). See also United States v. Joseph, 355 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
188 Compare Brown v. United States, 261 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1958).
28 United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 814 (1963).
110 United States v. White, 324 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1963).
02' In United States v. Ramsey, 220 F. Supp. 86, 90 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), the failure
of the prosecution to 'produce the contingent fee agent was considered grounds for
granting a new trial because it raised serious questions of "fair play."
'l 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1964), 15 ALA. L.
Rav. 603 (1963), 49 VA. L. R.v. 1021 (1963).
"'1 Of course the mere fact of employment does not constitute entrapment. Hayes v.
United States, 112 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1940). The use of a confirmed narcotic offender
as an informer while charges were pending against him has been criticized but found
not to establish entrapment *as a matter of law. Matysek v. United States, 321 F.2d
246, 249 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 917 (1964).
11 Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1964), 16 SvitAcusE L. Rcv. 143.
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government could give convincing reasons for the arrangement.1"5
Other cases have found that there is no contingent fee system merely
because the agent is paid according to the "extent and quality" of his
work 46 or because no one person was singled out for solicitation and
no per capita bounty was set.147 These distinctions appear to have
effectively sapped the beneficial Williamson rule of its efficacy. In
any event, the defendant would appear to be entitled to an instruction
on the credibility of the agent.14 8
RAISING THE DEFENSE
Perhaps the most difficult problems appendant to the doctrine of
entrapment emerge from the substantive and procedural questions
which arise in applying the defense. Quite naturally, all of the
uncertainties and inconsistencies which permeate the defense cul-
minate in and are magnified by the attempts by courts to apply it.
Procedure
It has been broadly stated that the defense of entrapment may
be investigated by the court on its own motion at any time,149 and
since a primary objective of the defense is to reveal and thereafter
check undesirable official conduct, one might expect courts to delve
vigorously into the issue whenever the testimony suggests it. On the
contrary, however, there has been an apparent reluctance by the
courts to permit the defendant to raise the defense except by estab-
lished procedures. While there have been efforts to adjudicate the
14 See Maestas v. United States, 341 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1965).
1
"4 See United States v. Crim, 340 F.2d 989, 990 (4th Cir. 1965)" (per curiam) (at-
tempt by defendant to exclude agent's testimony).
217 United States v. Costner, 359 F.2d 969, 973 (6th Cir. 1966).
18 United States v. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d 882, 886 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
520 (1938). Th' court held, however, that in the absence of a request for an in-
struction, failure to give one is not reversible error. Accord, Cratty v. United States,
163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946)
(court must caution the jury on the credibility of the witness).
Although the entrapper is not necessarily an accomplice, United States v. Becker,
52 F.2d 1007, 1009. (2d Cir. 1933), the analogy may suggest the basis for requiring a
cautionary instruction because the agent, like an accomplice, may have underlying
motives for wanting the defendant convicted. See Donnelly, supra note 135, at 1117-
21; Orfield, Corroboration of Accomplice Testimony in Federal Criminal Cases, 9
ViLL. L. R . 15, 29 (1963).
149 "The violation of the principles of justice by the entrapment of the unwary
into crime should be dealt with by the court no matter by whom or at what stage of
the proceedings the facts are brought to its attention." Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (concurring opinion); Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589, 591
(10th Cir. 1934).
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entrapment issue before trial by a motion to quash the indictment,6 0
by a motion to suppress evidence procured by entrapment, 151 or by
various pleas -in bar, 52 resolution has usually been postponed until
the trial. Defendants have also sought to attack a judgment col-
laterally after having failed to establish the defense directly at trial
or on appeal. It has been held, however, that entrapment cannot be
successfully interposed by a writ of habeas corpus' 53 nor can it be
urged in a motion to vacate the judgment under section 2255 of the
Judicial Code.154 It is also clear that the defendant cannot avoid
these rules by disguising his attack as a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. 55
The rules against entertaining collateral attacks are immediate
products of the absence of a recognized constitutional foundation
for the defense. 5 6 Entrapment in itself is said not to involve consti-
tutional guarantees no matter how obviously fundamental rights
might seem to be abridged. Despite this general rule, which applies
quite comfortably to an alleged entrapment where the government
officials conducted themselves in only a moderately obnoxious
fashion, it does not necessarily follow that entrapment can never be
150 United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (D. Conn. 1923).
111 See C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); Note,
28 COLUM. L. REv. 1067, 1075 (1928). But see State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 86
N.W.2d 446 (1957).
151 Romero v. Squier, 133 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 785 (1943);
Claiborne v. United States, 77 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1935). In Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932), the Government's contention that entrapment must be raised by a
special plea in bar was rejected. Id. at 452.
158 See Benson v. California, 336 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951
(1965); United States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois. 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 891 (1964); Romero v. Squier, supra note 152. But see United States v.
Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (ED. Pa. 1927).
.. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964): "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States
.. .or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. A motion for such relief
may be made at -any time."
Coronado v. United States, 341 F.2d 918 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 943 (1965);
United States v. Bailey, 331 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1964); Simmons v. United States, 302
F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962); Banks v. United States, 258 F.2d 318 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1950). Although an earlier case allowed the defendant to
raise entrapment by a motion under § 2255 to vacate the judgment, there was reliance on
an allegation of deprivation of the right to counsel. Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d
672 (9th Cir. 1957).
5 Coronado v. United States, supra note 154.
"s But see Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957).
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;o egregious as to amount to a due process violation. 15 7 Thus, courts
at least ought to permit the defendant to show that the particular
official conduct which entrapped him was revolting to "fundamental
notions of fair play."' 58
Entrapment can be and usually is raised by a plea of not guilty, 59
and it is error to require a special plea in bar.6 0 And where entrap-
ment appears on the conceded facts, the court may refuse to accept
a guilty plea and thereafter acquit. 61 However, a general motion
for a directed verdict, without more, will not raise the defense so
that error in failure to consider it will not thereby be preserved for
appellate consideration.10 2
During the course of the trial thedefendant can, through choice
or oversight and by operation of law, remove the issue of entrap-
ment from the case. For example, where the defendant objects to
evidence offered by the government on the issue of predisposition,
and the evidence is excluded, he cannot later allege error in the
court's failure to acquit for entrapment. 6 3 A very interesting, highly
criticized, and apparently waning rule which operates to deprive the
defendant of the defense is that one will not be permitted to deny
that he has committed the offense and still rely on entrapment. In
the federal courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been the
most vigorous in the statement and application of the .rule.16 4 Most
of the other circuits have at one time endorsed the rule indicating
that it is impermissibly inconsistent to argue: "I did not commit
the crime, but if I did, I was entrapped."' 56
157 See note 100 supra. Compare Benson v. California, 336 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965).
"' See note 100 supra.
US Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Henderson v. United States, 237
F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
200 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 159, at 452.
261 United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918). The court may also set
aside a judgment on its own motion. United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont.
1913).
162 United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1943).
116 Corcoran v. United States, 19 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1927).
2 See Ortiz v. United States, 358 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1966); Ortega v. United States,
348 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1965); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961);
Brown v. United States, 261 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1958); Eastman v. United States, 212
F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954).
'
1 8 See Silvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809
(1963); United States v. DiDonna, 276 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam); United
States v. Pagano, 207 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1953) (per curiam); Rodriguez v. United States,
227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955); Siglar v. United States, 208 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1954);
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The trend in the federal courts, however, seems to be toward
the rejection of the disarming simplicity of this position. In obvious
revolt against the undesirable consequences which the rule can
effect 6e and in an attempt to make criminal trials searches for truth
rather than contests to hide it, several courts have distinguished the
inconsistency rule. One line of cases would not apply it where the
evidence of entrapment is introduced by the testimony of the govern-
ment's witnesses. 6 7 Other cases have eroded the rule by restrictively
defining what constitutes an impermissible inconsistency. 16  Two
caseshave denied that there is an inconsistency in "alternative" allega-
tions of denial and entrapment, 6 9 thus effectively abandoning the
rule.170
It is generally held that the defense of entrapment is affirmative
and must be raised at trial,' 7' and a failure so to do will preclude the
United States v. Carter, 326 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d
219 (7th Cir. 1943); Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See Nutter
v. United States, 289 Fed. 484 (4th Cir. 1923).
The converse of the inconsistency doctrine has also been stated to the effect that
raising the defense amounts to an admission of the criminal acts. See United States
v. Georgiou, 333 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964).
ace While strict logic does. not uncover any possible "undesirable consequences"
associated with the rule, they would appear to exist in fact. First, it might be deemed
undesirable to permit the police to be insulated from censure merely because the
-defendant has decided, as a matter of strategy, to deny the commission of the offense
in hopes that the government cannot establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. Secondly,
raising the defense of entrapment opens for the government the floodgates which
otherwise protect the jury from receiving highly inflammatory evidence on the issue
of predisposition. Furthermore, the defendant's entrapment evidence may be weak,
as where it is. his word against an officer's. Fearing that the jury will be irreparably
prejudiced by the predisposition evidence and realizing the weakness of the entrap-
ment issue, the defendant might reasonably feel that silence is the best policy. Under
such circumstances, there appears to be no compelling reason why he should not, be
able to defend both against the general accusation and, by relying on entrapment,
against criminal liability. In fact, justice may best be served thereby.
16 Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 189, 143 (5th Cir. 1965) (conspiracy to violate
the liquor laws); see Notaro v. United States, 263 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).
268 See Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958); Henderson v. United
States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
168 Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Crisp v. United States,
262 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir. 1958): "We think it perfectly proper to allow a criminal
defendant to submit to the jury alternative defenses."
270 In the early case of Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925). the court
commented: "The court refused to submit the defense of entrapment, and did this on
the theory that defendant's theory was inconsistent with that defense. In a proper
case it would seem that defendant should have the benefit of this defense, even though
such inconsistency exists." Id. at 98.
In the recent case of United States v. Bishop, 367 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1966), the court
appeared to open the questioi for possible future treatment. Id. at 809 & n.4.
271 E.g., id. at 809-10; Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961); Cratty
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defendant from interposing it on appeal." 2 This rule both conserves
the time of the courts and prevents the defendant from securing the
exclusion of relevant but damaging evidence of predisposition which
the government might offer. Similarly, the defendant must preserve
any errors in the trial court's rulings by timely objections or offers
of requested instructions. 7 3 Absent the commission of plain error,
174
this is the only manner in which errors will be preserved for appellate
review.
Questions for the court and jury
The obscurities of the law of entrapment are also reflected in the
law's designation of the institution which must decide the issue of
entrapment. The question is usually one for the jury, deliberating
under proper instructions, 7 5 and it has been suggested that a refusal
to submit a proper case to the jury might deprive the defendant of his
right to a trial by jury.7 6  However, it is not deemed to be an en-
croachment upon the jury's prerogative for the judge to comment
fairly upon the entrapment evidence. 77
Although the trier of fact usually decides the issue, the defense
may be established as a matter of law upon the proofs adduced 78 or
upon a motion for a directed verdict. 7 9 Where the uncontroverted
proof demonstrates that the defense is unavailable because, for ex-
v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947); United States v. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d 882
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620 (1938).
72 E.g., United States v. Bishop, supra note 170; United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d
69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
'
17 E.g., United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1965); Marbs v. United
States, 250 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1957).
174 E.g., Cross v. United States, 347 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1965). See United States v.
Pugliese, supra note 173. EDz. R. C>iM. P. 52 (b) provides that "plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court."
115 E.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 364, 377 (1958); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932); United States v. Head, 353 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1965); Banks v.
United States, 348 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Georgiou, 333 F.2d
440 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); Hattem v. United States, 283 F.2d
839 (9th Cir. 1960)- Where there is entrapment, there is likely to be a question of the
credibility of witnesses. See Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1344 (1960); Note, 75 YALE
LJ. 942, 952-53 (1965).
'16 Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955). The court did not,
however, specify the elements of a "proper case."
177 Meyer v. United States, 67 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1933).
118 E.g., Morales v. United States, 260 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1958); Henderson v. United
States, 261 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3d
Cir. 1957); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
178 O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931).
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ample, the defendant conceived the scheme or was not actually in-
duced, the court may reject the defense.180 Similarly, if there is no
evidence of entrapment at all, the jury need not be instructed since
the defense cannot fairly be said to have been raised. 81
The most diffcult and vague aspect of finding entrapment as a
matter of law concerns the type and sufficiency-Qf evidence which
will *establish it. Entrapment has been found on the basis of the
undisputed evidence of a government agent8 2 or on the uncon-
troverted evidence of the defendant..1 3  However, it is not error for
the court to submit the issue to the jury where the credibility of the
undisputed defendant is questionable. 8 4 Where there is any conflict
in the evidence, the defendant is entitled to the defense as a matter
of law only if he establishes it beyond -a reasonable doubt. 8 5
Allocation and quantification of burdens of proof
Perhaps the most pregnant confusion shrouding the defense is
180 See Jasso v. United States, 290 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 858
(1961); Rodriguez v. United -States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955); Siglar v. United States,
208 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Markham, 191 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1951).
Recent cases, however, have been extremely reluctant to allow the government to
establish a lack of entrapment as a matter of law by proof that the defendant was
predisposed. See United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1966); Sagansky v.
United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1966). Several sound reasons underlay this
conclusion. The clear trend in the courts of appeals is to require the government to
prove the defendant's propensities beyond a reasonable doubt after the defendant
offers sufficient evidence of inducement. See notes 191-96 infra and accompanying text.
Thus, it is concluded that where the government's burden is so heavy, it cannot be
sustained as a matter of law, Sagansky v. United States, supra, at least, where the
government's evidence is not uncontradicted, United States v. Riley, supra.
181 "[Sjubmission is not -required when evidence of entrapment is entirely lacking."
Banks v. United States, 348 F.2d 231, 236 (8th Cir. 1965). Accord, United States v.
Gosser, 339 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1966); Redfield v.
United States, 328 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972 (1964); United States
v. Markham, supra note 180; Hall v. United States, 46 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 1931);
Vamvas v. United States, 13 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1926).
2
8
2 "Since the instant case . . . involves only consideration of the undisputed testi-
mony of a government witness with no issue of credibility involved we conclude that
submission of the issue of entrapment to the jury was improper." Marshall v. United
States, 258 F.2d 94, 97 (10th ir. 1958) (affirming conviction), rev'd on other grounds,
360 U.S. 310 (1959). See Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts,
and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRam. L., C. & P.S. 447, 452 (1959).
28 See Morales v. United States, 260 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1958).
'18 See United States v. Thomas, 351 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965).
185,"Under Sorrells, Sherman, and Masciale, the issue of entrapment is a question
for the jury, unless as a matter of law the defendant has established beyond a reason-
able doubt that he was entrapped." Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 689
(5th Cir. 1960). Accord, Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958). But see Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir.
1966).
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evident in the tacks which courts have taken in assigning the bur-
dens of proof between the defendant and the prosecution. The rules
of the doctrine and the theory which supports it have an obvious and
direct effect upon the determination as to who must prove what.
The analytical difficulty is compounded by the conspicuous absence
in some cases of any discussion of burdens of proof" 6 and by un-
responsive statements in other cases. For example, many courts have
allocated no burdens to the defendant but have merely required the
government to prove guilt of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable
doubt, 87 or to prove no entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. s8
Another case has been somewhat more specific in placing upon the
government the burdens to show "predisposition," but it has not
quantified this burden nor has it placed any burdens on the de-
fendant.18 9 Other cases explicitly require the inducement to be
shown, presumably by the defendant, before the government assumes
the burden of negating the defense.190
From this long background of confusion has come a series of more
recently developed rules, born in reasoned cases which have ac-
knowledged that the jury could be easily confused in the absence
of elucidation of the standards it must apply. Under these cases,
the defendant must usually establish the inducement, whereupon
the burden is shifted to the government to negate the defense.191
188 See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 347 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1965).
187 E.g., Meyer v. United States, 67 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1933); Gargano v. United
States, 24 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1928).
180 "The Government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was not an unlawful entrapment." Marbs v. United States, 250 F.2d 514, 516
(8th Cir. 1957) (quoting the district court). Accord, Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d
944, 945 (10th Cir. 1950); O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1931);
United States v. Clarke, 224 F. Supp. 647, 652 (E.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other grounds,
343 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1965) (Government must prove crime "beyond a reasonable doubt
without entrapment'). These holdings seem logically inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Sorrells and Sherman to the effect that entrapped acts are not
within the purview of the statute, and thus not crimes. They also suggest an incon-
sistency with the notion that entrapment is an affirmative defense. But see Note, 73
HAav. L. REV. 1333, 1344 (1960).
188 United States v. Klosterman, .248 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1957).
180 Hansford v. United States, 503 F.2d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
101 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, L., J.), 28
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1180 (1953); see Note, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 359, 363 (1964); Note, 70
HARV. L. REv. 1302, 1303 (1957); Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 578, 583 (1959). A third issue
which the government may have to prove is that it had prior knowledge of the
defendant's predisposition. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 884 (1963). See Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 202 n.10
(1st Cir. 1966); notes 59-63 supra.
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The quantum of the defendant's and the government's respective
burdens, however, differ substantially. In the Second Circuit, the
defendant must, at most, prove government inducement "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence," whereupon the burden shifts to the
government which must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
defendant was- predisposed.192  The same rule appears to obtain in
the Fifth Circuit. 93 The Seventh Circuit has also required that the
defendant prove inducement and then has shifted the burdens to the
government, but it has not quantified the defendant's burden.10 4
The First Circuit requires only that the defendant sustain the
burden-of "coming forward with evidence," whereafter the govern-
ment must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt by show-
ing predisposition. 95 The Ninth Circuit, in a noble effort to avoid
confusing the jury, has said that if the issue of entrapment has "fairly
arisen," the government must prove predisposition to the jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 96 However, the method by which the
1 92"No legal authority has imposed a heavier burden on a defendant for any
aspect of the entrapment issue than proof by a preponderance of the evidence ....
We would not increase this burden on the defendant (if indeed he should bear any
burden of proof whatever, a question we do not now reach)." (Emphasis added.)
United States v. Pugliese, 346 F.2d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1965). Accord, United States v.
Bishop, 867 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1966). A district court in the Second Circuit had applied
a more lax burden to the defendant in United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) ("burden of going forward').
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "A person prose-
cuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence
that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment." It is interesting to note that
there was no mention of the extent of the defendant's burden of proof in the earlier
tentative draft. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.10 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
1
"Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 654 (5th Cir. 1963): "[O]ne who raises the
defense should be required not only to come forward with evidence but should also
be required to establish inducement by a preponderance of the evidence."
'"United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1958).
195 Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1966). "Accordingly, if the evi-
dence, whether elicited from the government or defense witnesses, would warrant a
finding of inducement, the defendant is entitled to a charge that the government has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt either that there was in fact no induce.
ment, or that the defendant was predisposed, as we have previously defined predisposi-
tion. The evidence of inducement, or, conceivably, of the absence of predisposition,
may be so strong that either or both .questions must be resolved in the defendant's
favor as matter of law. Conversely, of course, if the defendant fails to meet his burden
of coming forward with evidence of inducement, there is no entrapment as a
matter of law, and thus, nothing on that matter to go to the jury. If, as in the
present case, ther6 was inducement as a matter of law, then only the question of
predisposition is submitted to the jury and the government has the burden of proving it
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 203. See Waker v. Urited States, 344 F.2d 795,
796 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1965).
296 Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966). "The duty of determining
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issue arises and the quantity of proof necessary for this purpose are
not satisfactorily explained. These vague standards do not create
as much trouble as they might since the preliminary question of
whether the issue has fairly arisen is decided by the judge, and only
after it is determined, does the jury pass upon predisposition evi-
dence.
CONCLUSION
The defense of entrapment in the federal courts continues to
suffer from the absence of a cohesive theoretical basis. The un-
certainties surrounding the. defense are further complicated by am-
bivalent judicial attitudes which indicate reluctance to accept its
sketchily defined basis and its results. In light of the fact that
the defense is primarily applied to crimes which are frequently con-
sidered the products of ill-advised statutes, one senses that some dis-
tortion has occurred in the formulation of the doctrine. Against this
background, the courts appear to be struggling toward piecemeal
answers with more or less commendable consequences. Most notably,
quantification and allocation of burdens of proof, appraisal of special
evidentiary problems, and separation of the respective functions of
court and jury are currently receiving judicial attention. Out of the
morass there appear to be emerging carefully wrought rules which
are not altogether consistent, a situation that may force the Supreme
Court to take up the gauntlet and resolve the conflicts which are in
the process of solidification.
whether or not the issue exists.is the judge's duty, not the jury's, and if the issue exists
and the determination of the ultimate question of entrapment is submitted to the
jury, 'it is better [that the instructions not] speak in terms of the defendant having [any
burden whatsoever].' [sic] .... The issue having appeared, it becomes the prosecution's
burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not entrapped into
the commission of the offense." Id. at 175.
